What is meant by the practical is taken for granted as something self-evident and is never questioned. And therein, I maintain, lies the greatest danger, for the concept"of the practical upon analysis turns out to be extremely comp lex. Even a brief examination reveals the sophi stry and superficiality involved in the popular notion of the term. The general poin t I shall try to establish in this paper is that much of the confusion in modern though t is due to a false separation between the claims of theory and practice; that in the last analysis the practical is rel ative to the theoretical and that t he two spheres are mutually supplementary.
In modern times · a theory is regarded as a likely hypothesis invented to describe or explain a group of phenomena. In science particularly, a theory has come to be considered· as a suggestion or proposed plan of action, and hen ce as something which has no validity or truth-claim until tested by its practical effects or consequences. The value of a theory is determined by its ability to lead to fruitful action. Theory is for the sake of action; practice is primary. In order to appreciate our modern a tti tude towards theory and practice, it will 113 be best to investigate briefly the development of these concep ts in the history of human though t. In what follows I shall presen t a brief histori cal a~alysis of the main philosophies of life from the Greeks to modern times, with special reference to the roles 'they assign to theory and practice.
The Greeks, as represented by Plato and Aristotle, clearly distinguished between theoretical and practical actlVlty. Theory .meant detached and contemplative vision, and as such was equivalent to what we moderns' mean by culture. Practice, on the other hand, involved the active effort or will to realize or embody through some form of motion the ideals of conduct conceived by the intellect. On the principle that "where objects differ in kind the part of the soul answering to· each is different,'" Aristotle disting~ished the theoretical from the prac tical reason. The former had for its object things eternal and necessary; the latter had for its object things mutable and contingent. The Greeks did not urge that the intellect was to be cultivated to the neglect of the body; they realized that the intellectual pursuits were dependent upon the acquisition of a virtuous character through the formation of rhythmic habi ts of activi ty. Their cardinal principle was tha t proportion and measure, the righ t mean, determined good and evil conduct. Man was an organic unity and his education must meet the requirements of both the physical and mental aspects of his nature; the life of the soul was to be expressed through the choral dance which included gymnastics for the body and poetry and music for the soul.' From the point of view of the individual who was being educated practice, expressed in the formation of habits, was prior' to theory; but from the point 
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of view of the educator, theory was to determine practlce. Plato and Aristotle agreed that the life of reason, contemplative activity, was not an end in itself; the philo-' sopher, as PIa to expressed it, mus t also be king. He mus t . re-descend into the cave of ignorance and enlighten those who have not beheld the sun of truth and reality. Thus practice as manifested through conduct determined theory a'nd theory determined condu~t.
Plato and Aristotle also introduced the principle of value. Self-expression was no t in itself a good; everything depended on the nature of the self expressed. All the activities of man were not on an equal basis; some were higher or more wo~thy than others, though all were necessary for a complete life. God. In Qrief, they both concurred that there were degrees of being among actual realities and that there were gradations o f value among human activities according to the nature of the objects towards which they were directed . Although they preferred theory to practice, they never separated them so as to exclude any interrelation between them. Man as part of nature was an organic unity; the cultivation of theory determined the practice of the educator, and practice as expressed in character and conduct determined one's theoretical outlook. The followers of Plato and Aristotle disturbed this harmony between theory and practice. The Neo-Platonists emphasized the mystical aspect of Plato's though t. Since the Ideas as norms of perfection were not derived by abstraction from sense-experience and the nobl~t life was the life of reason, they held that the wise man was he who withdrew as much as possible from the world and cultivated his intellect. Thi s attitude of mind was encouraged by two influences: first, the destruction of the Greek city state and the uncertainty of the ensuing times; second ly, the attempt to combine Platonism with Christianity.
The general tendency of this period was to regard body and soul as in opposition; the natural appetites of the body, such as the sexual appetite, were to be repressed and man's'concent was to be for the salvation of his soul. Happiness was primarily a personal matter, a 11 6 state of the spirit, and the important thing for salvation was right belief. This produced an other-w.orldly attitude; man was encouraged to disparage this wo·r1d and its pleasures and to retlre within himself.. The Neo-Platonists, such as Plotinus) regarded the mystical life, the life of ecstatic absorption in the One, as the height of perfection and the desired consummation. The growth of the monastic orders in the middle ages is due prlmarily to the desire on the part of large numbers of men and women who wished to withdraw from the world, to devote themselves to the salva tion of their souls.
All these tendencies or movements have this in common, namely', that they valued theory above practice) a state of private feeling more than action on the environmen t, belief more. than conduct. Whereas the Greeks regarded knowledge or righ t conviction as the indispensable condition of moral conduct)3 the Neo-Platonists, on the other hand, considered knowledge and belief as ends in themselves. In the history of religion the influence of this attitude of mind is shown in the fierce reljgious persecu tions of those who differed from the orthodox beliefs of the community.
With the Renaissance and Reformation there was a return to the humanism and naturalism of the Greeks.
In terest was revived in the scien tific knowledge of nature.
Man was encouraged to live the life of the senses and to participate in the affairs of social life. The recogni tion came about that a full life required the use of all man's powers; that man and nature were objects worthy of in terest and study. -Hence arose men like Bruno, Galileo, Hobbes, Newton, Descartes, and Spinoza, ~ho began afresh to investigate the nature of man and the physical world. There was a general questioning of authority in aSee G. S. Brett's PJyclj()/ogy .Ancienl and Modern, chap. ii, on this point .. 117 religion, science, and politics. Typi cal of the early seventeenth century was Descartes, who began his philosophical researches by doubting everything. Generally, it may be said, the tendency of the times was empirical; men observed the facts of nature and refused to accept the traditions and dogmas of established authority.
The British philosophers of the eighteenth century, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, developed the epistemological implications of the empirical method. However much they differed in details, the main though t they had in common was that knowledge of reality was given through sense-perception and that the truth of ideas ultimately depended on the immediate evidence of the senses. In other words, they main tained an a posteriori doctrine of knowledge in opposition to the a priori theories of the Scholastics and Rationalists. This tradi tion was con tinucd in the nineteen th cen cury by J. S.
Mill, who applied it to ethical and social problems. In his doctrine of Utilitarianism he urged that the value or worth of ~onduct and of social institutions was to be judged .by their utility or directly experienced consequences in promoting hum an happiness-a doctrine which did much to further social legislation in England.
This movement of thought culminated in the famolls critiques of Kant, the Critique oj Pure Reason and the · Critique oj Practic~l Reason. As the titles of his works indicate, Kant made a sharp division between theory and practice. ·Pure Reason was concerned only with phenomena, with appearances, but gave no knowledge of reality, of things-in-themselves. The Practical Reason gave knowledge of the requirements of moral conduct; it postulated the requirements of an intelligible world and an intelligible life. Kant thus introduced a radical bi-furcation in to human thought, which his successors tried vainly to bridge. . Fichte in his Vocation oj Man gave the priority to the practical· aspect of man's nature. We know reality because we ·must act; reason and theory involve one in hopeless, paralysing scepticism. In Hegel, however, we have a return to rationalism. According to Hegel, the ultimate reality is the absolute Idea which is all-inclusive. From the Absolute evolve all the phenomena of space and . time in rational order, from thesis to antithesis and synthesis. Hegel's fundamental doctrine was that "the . real is rational and the ra tional is real," and hence he attempted to deduce all the metaphysical categories which culminated, so he thought) in the German culture of his day. Hegel's philosophy tended to rationalize the existent state of affairs; its view was retrospective rather than forward-looking. It is against this aspect of Hegel's teaching that Marx later directed his criticism.
In this connection, account must also be taken of some of the philosophical presuppositions of Marxism, which is so vociferous in modern times. Marx regarded his theory a.s the logical developmen t of Hegel's·; it was Hegel's theory turned upside down.: Whereas Hegel had conceived the material·wor1d as the development or objectification of an Idea) and the historical process as th.e development of thought, Marx) on· the other hand, proposed matter and activity as the ultimate reality and Jooked upon human history as a struggle for the satisfaction of human needs. Ideals do not determine action;\ . action and the material requirements. of life determ·ine theory. The ·Marxist differs from the Pragma tist in that he is opposed to the notion that the truth of an idea de-· pends on the practical" interests which it sustains or satisfies; he believes that truth is something reve·aJed in the. 119 material conditions of his environment. As opposed to the Hegelians, the Marxists main tain that philosophy should not be merely a theoretical interpretation of the universe; philosophy should provide a plan of act ion having definite revolutionary consequences.
With the rise of the theory of evolution as enunciated by Charles Darwin, the practical was again given the primacy in general thought. Evolution of species was said to occur through the struggle for existence, which required constant adaptation to environment, so that only the fittest survived. The theory of evolu tion as developed by Darwin and Lamarck differed from that of Hegel in that the Darwinian theory was entirely naturalistic and introduced no transcendent agencies such as Hegel's Absolute Idea which predetermined the course of evolution. The emphasis was put on the practical efforts and spontaneous variations of the individuals who endeavoured to maintain themselves in a changing world.
This doctrine soon showed its influence in philosophy. -Bergson in France, Schiller in England, and James and Dewey in America, developed some of the philosophical implications of the new doctrine. All agreed th at the search for truth was the result of the practical requirements of man in relation -to his environment. The truth _ of an idea or theory was dependent on its consequences in leading to the desired resul ts; the working or consequences of an idea were relevant to its truth. This attitude, it is obvious, is entirely different from the traditional Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions which gave theory a validity independent of practical needs.
One of the most importan t influences of the theory of evolution in modern thought is to be seen in the work of Nietzsche. Nietzsche regarded the will as fundamental in human nature and pointed out, with all the 120 force of a new revelation, that it is the will which determines one's morals and values. Philosophical theory is a direct product of the will of individuals or classes to enjoy power in relation to other individuals. In other words, all theory is relative to the requirements of the will) but what is practical is dependent upon the ends or values desired. He recognized that what ultimately distinguishes differen t cultures is the nature of the ultimate values they entertain and urged "the transvaluation of all traditional standards of value." In his
Genealogy oj Morals and his Will to Power he advocated the values which gave the privileged position to the forceful Superman in place of the Hebrew-Christian system which gave a privileged position to the weak and poor. Nietzsche thus introduced the critique of moral values as a distinct branch of study in modern ethical thought.
4

II
The above survey makes it clear that there has been a constan t shifting in the emphasis placed upon theory and practice at different periods of history. , On the whole, I believe) that in this, as in so many other matters, we can do nO better than to re-capture the vision or the Greeks. They acknowledge' d once for all the com plemen tary character of theory and practice and did not emphasize one at the expense of the other. The modern age, it seems to me, has gone to extremes in emphasizing the practical , almost exclusively and in disparaging the theoretical. ,We must come to realize that the term "practical" is compl~x and that it must not be empJoyed as if it has a narrow) fixed meaning. The practical is that which can be done or achieved; b~t it must be r.ealized that {See W. M. Urban's article in Contemporary American Fhilo.rophy. what can be done is, as Kant pointed out, relative to what ought to be done. In other words, the practical is relative to one's theory of values. What is practical for a religio.us man, is unpractical for an atheist.. All the wisdom of the prophets consists simply in the transvaluation of the curren t practical values of their day.
In order to avoid a sharp division between theory and practice, we must distinguish DNO separate factors in all theory) namely, the fixed formal principle and the varying material content. As Plato· saw) the form·al principle remains constant but the material content is always changing. For example) the nature of justice does not change frolTI time to time) but the degree of justice in a particular act varies wi th time and circumstance. It is .
because people who pride themselves on their practicality neglect this distinction that so much bigotry and abuse still prevail. They fail to realize that an act which is practical or useful in one set of circumstances may be unpractical and unjust in another set. Thus it is the narrowly practical people, who are always in tent on doing something but not on thinking of the significance of their acts, who are in the end among the most unpractical. It is the so-called practical people who corrupt religion and morals by persisting in acts and customs which no longer serve the purpose for which they were intended. And it is the {(practical" folk "who are concerned only wi th making a living bu t not with how they make it) who are responsible for most of our economi c evils.
I repeat) theory arid practice are alw~ys relative to each other and. must supplemen t each other if man is to liv:e a rational life. Theory without practice is vain; practice without theory is blind and evil. The good life requires a happy combination· of both. In the last resort) the well-being of man must. be the one cri terion)
As Spinoza pointed out, a theory which enables a man to be a good citizen cannot be entirely wrong, however erroneous it may appear. Similarly, practice which is harmful in its consequences cannot be good, however rational the theory on which it is based. The neglect of the former principle leads to intolerance and persecution; the neglect of the latter condones abuses: Only when theory and practice are in harmony can we be certain that we have a vision of truth. My thesis is that theory must be tested by pragmatic consequences, by its ability to satisfy human needs and experience; bud maintain with the Platonist that theory, though suggested by material conditions, is not ab--stracted from, or entirely dependent upon, these conditions. I believe, following Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, and Spinoza, that mind or intellect has a creative activity -of its oWn which is not determined by material circumstances. The ends or values which the in tellect conceives and the will strives to realize, are not mere abstractions of actual experiences or desires, but have an eternal reality or validity independent of all temporal considerations. The ideals of tru th, goodness, and beauty, are ultimate values which cannot be explained in terms of something other or lower than themselves. The value of a theory does not consist merely in its being a means to practice; the validity of a conceptual value is inherent in, and pertains intrinsically to, itself. Hence I am opposed to the pragmatic conceptio-n of theory which regards truth and value as entirely relative to the satisfaction of desires or interests. And I am also opposed to the Marxist doctrine which makes theory dependent upon economic conditions and a means to revolutionary aCtiVIty. I believe with Carlyle . that theoretical ideals as en visioned by great men often serve to change the social environment. The intellec t of man communes with eternal verities and man by nature is free to strive for, and attain, whatever ideals of life he acknowledges. If Carlyle goes to one extreme in his Heroes and Hero Worship when he maintains that "the history of the . world is the biography of great men," Marx, I suggest, goes to the opposite extreme in his emphasis upon the determining effect of material conditions, thereby making the great man simply the product of the times. The theories of great men and the conditions of the material and social environment act as mutually complementary, though independen t, forces. One cannot, and must not, be reduced to the other.
J believe that the intellect of man may visualize realities and values which transcend hi s actual environment. T here are idears of absolute perfection and of an absolutely perfect being which are never apparent to actual experience and are not derived from ma terial facts, but which nevertheless determ ine vitally the conduct of those who behold and acknowledge them. One of the pernicious influences of the theory of evolution has been the tendency to explain all theoretical pursu its as mere means for the satisfaction of primitive instinc ts and impulses;and the result has been to take all final value and meaning out of life. It is assumed that life is an end in itself and intrinsically in telligible , but this, I urge, is far from true. The fact is that life itself is not worth living unless directed to the knowledge and realization of impersonal values which transcend life; the meaning and value of life must be sought outside of Iife. ' The predominance of the theory of evolution in modern thought has had the effect of making thinkers ignore the independent reality and validity of our ideals and of dena turing all values in to practical means of survival.
In actual life, theory as the critical in terpretation of ISce M. R. Cohen's ReaJon and NlJture (or a lucid discussion of this point.
life and the universe, rnust guide. conduct or practice. Our theories must be based on an empirical analysis and observation of the facts of nature. But this does not imply a "positivistic" attitude "towards facts) wherein the mind does not transcend the observed phenomena. The mind of man ever seeks an ultimate metaphysical principle "which renders the phenomena perceived in telligi ble " to him. In other words, as Aristotle""urged) man seeks the final cause of things and their purpose and'desiinatibn. I t " may be useful for certain .immeclia"te needs of applied science to ignore such investigations, bu t as Bergson " points out, the philosopher who is not content with the abstractions of science w.ill seek "to" in tui t and appreh~n" d the finaJ intelligible reality. The human.int"ellect thr9ugh-:
ou t the cen turies has maintained tha t there is a " " mo~t perfect being or absolu te mind which is the " creator of "the things of nature and transcends nature. God is both immanent in the world and transcends "the world.
Similarly, man lS both worldly and'"other-worldly; and the reality of his ideals and visions is often "more important to him than the stubborn facts 'wi"th 'which 0eis c~n" fron ted. " At times the vision of ' things ex~e11en t and " -divine is so abs~rbing that he does" not "wish to" t~k:e further in terest in earthly things; he seeks the ",mysde'B escape from the hmitations of space and time--as Schopenhauer advised all to do who would dwell in " .peace, free from the restless urgings of the will. Bu t, as Plato said) the good man will not seek to es~ape the sordid reali ties of life, "and wi1l strive to mould "this so" rry s"tate of things?' according to the mind's vision of truth and · beauty. PhlIosophical can templation must issue in practice and serve as a guide to human well-being. As scien tific investigation and invention increase the means of good Jiving, philosophic insight must be utilized to educate men, so as to erea te at? environment sui table for the good lif~.
